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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
 
         A federal jury was presented with four claims filed by 
James Mosley against Joseph Wilson, a police officer of East 
Fallowfield Township, Chester County, Pennsylvania: two claims 
for violations of Mosley's civil rights filed pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, one of which was for arrest without probable cause 
and the other for use of excessive force, and two pendent state 
law claims, of which one was for malicious prosecution and the 
other for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The jury 
returned a verdict for plaintiff Mosley on the malicious 
prosecution claim, and for defendant Wilson on the other three 
claims. 
         The district court granted Wilson's post-trial motion 
and entered judgment as a matter of law for him on the malicious 
prosecution claim.  Mosley appeals.  
                               I.   
                   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
         This action arose out of events that were the subject 
of a criminal prosecution brought in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Chester County, Pennsylvania.  Because Mosley's civil case was 
tried by a jury and the district court had no occasion to make 
detailed factual findings, we rely largely on the depiction of 
the relevant background events as set forth in Commonwealth v. 
Mosley, 535 Pa. 549, 637 A.2d 246 (1993), the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court's opinion on Mosley's appeal in the criminal case. 
         The initial events that transpired on the evening of 
January 31, 1989 are essentially undisputed.  About midnight, 
Mosley, described by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as "somewhat 
disconcerted," arrived at the police station in East Fallowfield 
Township and met with defendant Officer Joseph Wilson, who was on 
duty that night.  Id. at 247.  Mosley told Wilson that he had had 
an argument with Sharon Smith, and that he had come to report his 
version of the events before he was arrested.  While Mosley was 
in the police station, the police dispatcher informed Wilson that 
Smith had called in a complaint against Mosley.  Officer Wilson 
then drove Mosley back to his residence in an attempt to mediate 
the dispute.  Id. 
         After arriving at Mosley's home, Wilson went inside to 
speak to Smith, leaving Mosley in his patrol car.  He returned a 
few minutes later and told Mosley that he was under arrest for 
assault and rape.  (We note that Mosley was never charged with 
any crime in connection with the alleged assault and rape of 
Smith.)  Wilson then locked Mosley in the police car and made a 
radio call for backup assistance from a neighboring municipality, 
and was shortly joined by his brother, Sergeant Lewis Wilson.  
The two officers went inside the house to continue interviewing 
Smith, and left Mosley locked in the back of the patrol car.  Id. 
         From this point, the accounts of the evening's events 
diverge.  The police officers maintain that while they were 
questioning Smith, Mosley began to bang violently and kick the 
inside of the police car, that Officer Wilson (the defendant in 
this case) attempted to handcuff him, that Mosley lunged at 
Officer Wilson and attempted to grab his gun while threatening to 
kill him, that they struggled and Sergeant Wilson ran outside and 
pulled Mosley off his brother, and that after several minutes of 
"wrestling," they handcuffed Mosley and took him to the hospital.  
Id.  
         Mosley's vastly different version of the story is that 
after he was locked in the car for 30 minutes while the officers 
spoke with Sharon Smith, he began to bang on the inside of the 
car to get the officers' attention and gain his release.  Officer 
Wilson came outside, opened the car door and assaulted him, and 
then pulled him out of the car and continued the assault, aided 
by Sergeant Wilson, until they beat him into submission before 
finally taking him to the hospital.  Id. 
         Mosley was prosecuted and tried before a state court 
jury on charges arising out of the events, which convicted him on 
charges of terroristic threats, simple assault, recklessly 
endangering another person, and resisting arrest, in violation of 
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706, § 2701(a)(1), § 2705, and § 5104, 
respectively.  Mosley was acquitted of aggravated assault.  In 
addition, the trial court found Mosley guilty of the summary 
offenses of criminal mischief and disorderly conduct, 18 
Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(2) and § 5503(a)(1).   
         On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned 
Mosley's conviction because a key prosecution witness, Sergeant 
Wilson, had an ex parte conversation outside the courtroom with a 
juror who eventually became the jury foreperson.  During the 
conversation, the juror told Sergeant Wilson that he was from 
West Caln and was a friend of the Chief of Police there, and 
Sergeant Wilson "complimented the juror on the quality of his 
hometown police department."  Id. at 249.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in failing to 
question the juror about any possible taint that might have 
resulted from this conversation and therefore the judge was 
unable to determine whether the encounter constituted harmless 
error.  Accordingly, the Court vacated Mosley's conviction and 
granted him a new trial.  Id. at 250.  Instead of retrying the 
case, however, the prosecutor granted Mosley nolle prosequi and 
dropped all criminal charges against him.    
         Before the resolution of his appeal of conviction, 
Mosley filed this civil suit against Officer Wilson, Sergeant 
Wilson, and police chief Peter Mango, alleging that the police 
committed battery, assault, false imprisonment, malicious 
prosecution, and malicious use and abuse of process.  Mosley 
eventually dismissed the claims against Sergeant Lewis Wilson and 
Peter Mango, and trial proceeded before a jury on all claims 
against Officer Joseph Wilson in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, bifurcated as to liability and damages.  The first 
trial ended in a hung jury.  At the second trial, Mosley's claims 
were reduced to two federal civil rights claims filed pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging arrest without probable cause and use 
of excessive force, and two pendent state law tort actions of 
malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mosley on the 
state claim of malicious prosecution, but found for Wilson on all 
other counts. 
         Following the verdict, Wilson, arguing that the verdict 
on malicious prosecution was inconsistent with the verdict in his 
favor on the civil rights claims, moved to "mold the verdict into 
a consistent verdict." App. at 102.  The district court granted 
the motion, issuing judgment as a matter of law pursuant to  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 for Wilson on the malicious prosecution claim 
on the ground that the verdicts on the different counts were 
"blatantly inconsistent."  Id.  The district court reasoned that 
because the jury must have found that probable cause existed to 
find for Wilson on the unlawful arrest claim, and because 
probable cause for arrest is a "necessary element" in the 
malicious prosecution claim, the verdicts were legally 
inconsistent.  The district court reasoned: "If probable cause 
existed for one claim, it had to exist for the other claim."  Id.  
Consequently, the court "molded" the verdict in favor of Wilson 
on all counts.   
         Mosley's appeal brief states that he seeks 
reinstatement of the malicious prosecution verdict, and if he 
could present his damage claim to the same jury he would waive 
retrial on the civil rights claims.  He states that if that jury 
is not available, he seeks remand for a new trial on both his 
malicious prosecution claim and on his civil rights claims, 
because the latter were marred by a legally erroneous 
instruction.  Obviously, the same jury is not available, and we 
confine ourselves to Mosley's request for a new trial on the 
civil rights claims as well as the malicious prosecution claim. 
                               II. 
                            DISCUSSION 
                                A. 
         We consider first Mosley's contention that the district 
court erred in applying Rule 50(b) setting aside the jury's 
verdict for Mosley on the malicious prosecution claim based on  
the court's view that that verdict was inconsistent with the 
jury's verdict for Wilson on the civil rights claims.  Our review 
of the court's grant of judgment as a matter of law is plenary.  
Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 
613 (3d. Cir. 1995).  
         Under Rule 50(a), the court may grant judgment as a 
matter of law only if "a party has been fully heard on an issue 
and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a 
reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue."  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 50(a).  In granting judgment as a matter of law following 
a jury verdict, the district court must view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party, and determine 
whether the record contains the "'minimum quantum of evidence 
from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.'"  Parkway 
Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 691 (3d Cir. 
1993) (quoting Keith v. Truck Stops Corp., 909 F.2d 743, 745 (3d 
Cir. 1990)).   
         Here, the district court did not conclude that there 
was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of 
malicious prosecution.  Instead, the court concluded only that 
the jury's verdict for Mosley on the malicious prosecution claim 
was inconsistent with its verdict for Wilson on the civil rights 
claim.  The court explained as follows:           
 
         In order for the jury to have found in favor of the 
         defendant on plaintiff's civil rights claim for arrest 
         without probable cause, the jury would have had to 
         conclude that the defendant did in fact have probable 
         cause to arrest the plaintiff.  However, in order to 
         have found in favor of the plaintiff on the malicious 
         prosecution claim, the jury would have had to conclude 
         that the defendant lacked probable cause to arrest 
         plaintiff since lack of probable cause is a necessary 
         element of a claim for malicious prosecution in 
         Pennsylvania. . . . Thus, the jury's verdict as to 
         those two claims was blatantly inconsistent. 
 
App. at 102 (emphasis in original). 
         Wilson cites no authority that authorizes a district 
court to grant judgment as a matter of law based on the jury's 
inconsistency on different claims.  The closest analog in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure appears in Rule 49(b) which 
considers the appropriate course when a jury returns inconsistent 
answers to interrogatories or when a general verdict is 
accompanied by one or more inconsistent interrogatory answers.  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b).  In the latter circumstance the 
district court must either return the jury for further 
consideration of the verdicts or order a new trial.  As we 
explained in Repola v. Morbark Industries, Inc., 934 F.2d 483, 
495 (3d Cir. 1991), it would be "[n]either fair [n]or appropriate 
simply to excise the jury's . . . finding and to enter judgment 
for [defendant]" based on the jury's verdict on a different claim 
that rendered the verdicts inconsistent.  Without the court 
finding that the evidence was insufficient, the decision would be 
arbitrary and would trench on the Seventh Amendment. 
         Indeed, the inappropriateness of entering judgment as a 
matter of law solely on the basis of inconsistent verdicts is 
evident in the procedural requirements for such a judgment 
established by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  A motion 
for judgment as a matter of law rendered after trial must be made 
on grounds that were previously asserted in a motion for directed 
verdict prior to submission of the case to the jury.  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 50(b) advisory committee's note; see also Simmons v. City 
of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1077 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 503 
U.S. 985 (1991); Abraham v. Pekarski, 728 F.2d 167, 172 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984).  Obviously the 
inconsistency of the verdicts could not have been raised in a 
motion for directed verdict prior to jury deliberations. 
         Rule 49(b) does not address the issue before us here - 
that of inconsistent general verdicts.  We have found little 
precedent on this issue but there is a comprehensive discussion 
of inconsistent general verdicts in the opinion of Justice 
Stevens in Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 804-06 (1986) 
(Stevens, J. dissenting), where the underlying fact pattern bore 
some similarity to that before us.  Although the Supreme Court 
did not address the issue before us in its per curiam decision, 
Justice Stevens' dissent did discuss at some length whether 
inconsistent general verdicts in a civil case should be allowed 
to stand.  Justice Stevens noted that when faced with apparently 
inconsistent verdicts in a civil case, the district court can 
take several approaches.  He noted that "in certain 
circumstances, a court retains the authority, even in a civil 
case, to allow an apparently inconsistent verdict to stand."  
Heller, 475 U.S. at 805; see United States Football League v. 
National Football League, 644 F. Supp. 1040, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 
(stating that "inconsistent verdicts on separate claims in a 
civil action are fully permissible."), aff'd, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d 
Cir. 1988); see also Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 
F.2d 1276, 1290 n.17 (2d Cir. 1969) (stating that "consistent 
jury verdicts are not, in themselves, necessary attributes of a 
valid judgment."), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).   
         Second, Justice Stevens noted the court's "duty to 
attempt to read the verdict in a manner that will resolve 
inconsistencies."  Heller, 475 U.S. at 806.  In this court, that 
requirement is illustrated by our decision in Loughman v. Consol- 
Pennsylvania Coal Co., 6 F.3d 88, 108 (3d Cir. 1993), holding 
that a jury's finding that 100% of the harm was due to one 
defendant's actions was not inconsistent with the jury's finding 
of liability for all of the defendants.   
         Third, Justice Stevens referred to the trial judge's 
responsibility "upon receiving an apparently inconsistent verdict 
. . . not to retain half of the verdict, but to resubmit the 
question to the jury."  Heller, 407 U.S. at 806.  That duty is 
comparable to the requirement imposed by Rule 49(b) when the 
answers to special interrogatories are inconsistent.  See note 1, 
supra. 
         Finally, Justice Stevens observed that "if verdicts are 
genuinely inconsistent and if the evidence might support either 
of the 'inconsistent' verdicts, the appropriate remedy is 
ordinarily, not simply to accept one verdict and dismiss the 
other, but to order an entirely new trial."  Heller, 407 U.S. at 
806.  He then cited this court's opinion in Malley-Duff & 
Associates, Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133, 145 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984), which, although it 
dealt with inconsistent special verdicts under Rule 49(a) rather 
than inconsistent general verdicts, is illustrative of the 
procedure to be used in the latter situation.   
         It is of considerable significance that none of the 
approaches referred to by Justice Stevens supports the action of 
the district court in this case, i.e., directing a judgment 
notwithstanding the jury's verdict on one claim on the sole 
ground that it was inconsistent with the jury's verdict on 
another claim.  It follows that the district court erred as a 
matter of law. 
                                B. 
         Wilson argues that we should sustain the district 
court's order on the ground that it "correctly amended" the 
jury's verdict for Mosley on his malicious prosecution claim 
because the jury's verdict was precluded as a matter of law.  He 
argues that despite the later reversal of Mosley's conviction by 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Mosley's conviction by the jury 
for terroristic threats, assault, reckless endangerment and 
resisting arrest, and the court's conviction of him on his 
summary offenses arising out of the same incident, was 
dispositive of the probable cause issue in his civil action. 
Therefore, he claims, the issue of probable cause should never 
have gone to the jury.                  
         Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, bars 
relitigation of issues adjudicated in a prior action.  Swineford 
v. Snyder County Pa., 15 F.3d 1258, 1266 (3d Cir. 1994).  Under 
this principle a conviction ordinarily will be a bar to a 
subsequent state court suit for damages, such as one for 
malicious prosecution.  See W. Page Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, 
& D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 119, at 874 
(5th ed. 1984).  The underlying rationale given is that because a 
plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action must show the 
favorable termination of the underlying proceeding, a civil 
plaintiff whose conviction has not been reversed is unable to 
prove one of the essential elements of the tort - lack of 
probable cause for the proceeding.  Id. 
           A different situation is presented when a conviction 
has later been overturned.  The courts appear to be divided on 
the preclusive effect that the initial conviction should have on 
the issues of probable cause for the arrest and/or prosecution in 
a subsequent action for malicious prosecution brought against the 
police or municipal authorities.  On one hand, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, views a conviction, even if later overturned, 
as "conclusively establish[ing] the existence of probable cause, 
unless the conviction was obtained by fraud, perjury or other 
corrupt means."  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 667(1) (1977).  
The rationale given is that a guilty verdict establishes "that 
the person who initiated the proceedings had reasonable grounds 
for so doing."  Id. at § 667(1) cmt. b. 
         On the other hand, there is "a considerable minority 
view which regards the conviction as creating only a presumption, 
which may be rebutted by any competent evidence showing that 
probable cause for the prosecution did not in fact exist."  
Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 119, at 882.  
         The division among the states was noted in the separate 
opinions in Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), where a 
closely divided Supreme Court considered the related issue of the 
effect of a conviction on the plaintiff's right to recover 
damages in a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion, which held that "in 
order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions 
whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, 
a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has 
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, 
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such 
determination, or called into question by a federal court's 
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."  Id. at 2372 (emphasis 
added).  Justice Souter, writing separately for the four Justices 
who concurred only in the judgment, agreed with the majority 
insofar as its rule applied to prison inmates seeking § 1983 
damages in federal court, but objected to application of the 
majority's rule to those civil plaintiffs "who cannot first 
obtain a favorable state ruling," or who can no longer bring a 
habeas action because they are no longer in custody.  Id. at 2379 
(Souter, J. concurring in the judgment).  
          Heck did not involve a conviction that had been 
reversed on direct appeal, as Mosley's was here, but in the 
course of the two opinions and their footnotes the Justices 
alluded to the effect of a conviction that was later reversed on 
a common law malicious prosecution claim.  Justice Souter cited 
authority that at common law a prior conviction, although 
reversed, "dissolved [a] claim for malicious prosecution because 
the conviction was regarded as irrebuttable evidence that the 
prosecution never lacked probable cause."  Id. at 2377.  He 
acknowledged that this rule has been relaxed in more recent 
times.  Id. at 2377 n.3.  
         Justice Scalia responded that even early in the common 
law it was recognized that there must be exceptions (such as in 
cases involving fraud, perjury, or mistake of law) to "the 
general rule that a conviction defeated the malicious prosecution 
plaintiff's allegation (essential to his cause of action) that 
the prior proceeding was without probable cause."  Id. at 2372 
n.4.  He further noted that the Court had recognized in Crescent 
City Live Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union Slaughter-House Co., 120 
U.S. 141, 149 (1887)), that "'[h]ow much weight as proof of 
probable cause shall be attributed to the judgment of the court 
in the original action, when subsequently reversed for error, may 
admit of some question.'"  Id.  
         We must look to the current state of Pennsylvania law 
because malicious prosecution is a common law claim, and we are 
bound to give a state court judgment the same preclusive effect 
as would the courts of that state.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988); 
Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1266.  If the highest court has not spoken 
to the issue, we can garner assistance from the decisions of the 
state's intermediate appellate courts in predicting how the 
state's highest court would rule.  Gares v. Willingboro Township, 
90 F.3d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1996); McKenna v. Pacific Rail Serv., 
32 F.3d 820, 825 (3d Cir. 1994). 
         The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has apparently not 
determined what preclusive effect should be given to a conviction 
that was later overturned in a subsequent malicious prosecution 
suit.  There are contrary signals from the intermediate 
Pennsylvania courts.  Compare Cosmas v. Bloomingdales Bros., 
Inc., 442 Pa. Super. 476, 482, 660 A.2d 83, 86 (1995) (stating 
that a conviction even if overturned is conclusive proof of the 
existence of probable cause unless the party can show undue 
influences at work in the conviction proceedings) with Cap v. K- 
Mart Discount Stores, Inc., 357 Pa. Super. 9, 12, 515 A.2d 52, 53 
(1986) (holding that conviction by a justice of the peace 
reversed on appeal does not preclude action for malicious 
prosecution even without any showing of undue influence in the 
process).  Fortunately, we need not predict in this case 
precisely how the state supreme court would resolve the issue 
because under either analysis, Mosley's jury conviction, which 
was later overturned, could not preclude litigation of the issue 
of probable cause in this civil action.                   
          
         In this case, we will assume arguendo that Wilson 
correctly states that under Pennsylvania law "the overturning of 
a conviction does not negate the finding of probable cause by the 
court absent 'fraud or other undue influences.'" Appellee's brief 
at 11 (quoting Cosmas, 660 A.2d at 86).  We therefore proceed to 
examine the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion reversing 
Mosley's conviction to ascertain whether the basis for its action 
undermines the effect of the original conviction on the 
establishment of probable cause.   
         Examination of the opinion shows that the Court 
reversed Mosley's conviction because of its concern that Mosley's 
trial was tainted by a lack of objectivity on the part of the 
jury.  The Court "decline[d] to adopt a per se rule which would 
require the disqualification of a juror anytime there is ex parte 
contact between that juror and a witness," but instead held that 
when such a "communication or contact has occurred between a 
juror and a witness, prejudice may be inferred at the discretion 
of the trial judge."  Mosley, 637 A.2d at 249.  To rebut the 
inference of prejudice, "the communication must be explained or 
shown to be harmless."  Id. 
         The Court then reviewed the contact in this case:  
              In the instant case, an important Commonwealth 
         witness engaged in an ex parte conversation with a 
         juror who later served as foreman of the jury.  The 
         witness, Sergeant Lewis Wilson, was not only one of the 
         arresting officers, but was also directly involved in 
         the altercation which led to the charges upon which 
         Appellant was convicted.  Since there were no 
         corroborating eye witnesses, the case turned on a 
         credibility determination between Appellant and the two 
         police officers. 
 
              The conversation between Sergeant Wilson and the 
         juror amounted to more than a brief, incidental 
         contact.  The two engaged in a dialogue in which the 
         juror conveyed the fact that he was from West Caln and 
         was a friend of the Chief of Police in that 
         municipality.  Sergeant Wilson then complimented the 
         juror on the quality of his hometown police department. 
 
Id. at 249.  The Court further stated:   
 
              Although we diverge from the "rebuttable 
         presumption of prejudice" rule used by the [Supreme 
         Court of Utah] in Pike, we agree with the view that a 
         juror may be subject to a subconscious influence or 
         bias as a result of an unexpected cordial encounter 
         with a witness.  This subconscious influence may have 
         the improper effect of enhancing the credibility of the 
         witness in the eyes of that juror. 
 
              In the instant case, the trial judge never 
         questioned the juror about any possible taint which may 
         have resulted from his conversation with Sergeant 
         Lewis.  Instead, defense counsel was given the 
         opportunity to call witnesses in support of his Motion 
         to Disqualify the Juror.  This placed defense counsel 
         in the difficult position of deciding whether to avoid 
         questioning the juror or run the risk of antagonizing a 
         juror who might remain to decide his client's fate.  
         The juror was never called as a witness by either side 
         at the voir dire hearing on the Motion.  Without the 
         juror's testimony, the trial judge was not in a 
         position to determine that the encounter between 
         Sergeant Wilson and the juror amounted to harmless 
         error.  Consequently, the trial judge's denial of 
         Appellant's Motion to Disqualify the Juror was an abuse 
         of discretion. 
 
Id. at 250.  The Court concluded:   
 
              We, therefore, cannot say with any degree of 
         certainty that the contact did not establish a rapport, 
         albeit unconscious, between Sergeant Wilson and the 
         jury foreman which in some way influenced the outcome 
         of the trial. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
         The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's lack of confidence in 
the reliability of the factfindings seems to us to be precisely 
the sort of "undue influence" referred to in Cosmas and 
encompassed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 667(1).  Even 
courts that today adhere to the view that a conviction 
notwithstanding reversal is proof of probable cause leave some 
opening for these situations where the reversal impugns the 
reliability or integrity of the factfinding in the initial 
conviction.  That was certainly the case in the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court's reversal of the conviction in Mosley.  We believe 
that the Pennsylvania courts, even if the position in Cosmos is 
adopted by its Supreme Court, would find that the circumstances 
set forth in the Mosley opinion are the kind of "undue influence" 
that negates the finding of probable cause that stems from the 
initial conviction.  For this reason, we hold that Mosley's 
conviction in the Court of Common Pleas on charges of terroristic 
threats, simple assault, recklessly endangering another person 
and resisting arrest are not conclusive of whether there was 
probable cause to prosecute him for these offenses.  Accordingly, 
once his conviction was overturned, he was entitled to litigate 
the issue in his civil case and the district court erred in 
declining to give Mosley the benefit of the jury's judgment on 
his claim of malicious prosecution. 
         We will therefore reverse the trial court's order 
granting judgment as a matter of law on the malicious prosecution 
claim.  Because the district court entered its judgment before 
the jury considered the damage issue, we will remand for a new 
trial. 
                                C. 
         Of course, the Supreme Court's holding in Heck would 
also apply to Mosley's § 1983 claims, the issue directly before 
the Court in that case.  However, the district court permitted 
Mosley's § 1983 claims to go to the jury, which decided against 
him.  Mosley nonetheless argues that he is entitled to a new 
trial on his civil rights claims because the district court gave 
an erroneous jury charge.  The portion of the charge to which 
Mosley points was as follows: 
         The negligence on the part of a police officer does not 
         violate a person's constitutional rights . . . .  In 
         order to find the police officer liable to the 
         plaintiff, you must find that he acted with deliberate 
         or reckless indifference to [Mosley's] safety.  
         Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 828 (3d Circuit 
         1984), affirmed sub nom. Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 
         668 (1986).   
 
              Deliberate or reckless indifference does not 
         simply mean extreme carelessness; it means much more.  
         To be found deliberately or recklessly indifferent, the 
         defendant must have disregarded a serious known risk of 
         harm under circumstances which make that disregard 
         clearly unreasonable. 
 
App. at 33-34 (emphasis added).  At the court's invitation, a 
juror requested that these paragraphs be repeated as soon as they 
were given, and the court did so.   
         Our review of the jury charge is plenary as Mosley 
claims the district court employed an incorrect legal standard in 
stating that Mosley was required to prove deliberate indifference 
by the police officer to succeed on those claims.  Griffiths v. 
Cigna Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 462 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
865 (1993).  If, looking at the charge as a whole, "the 
instructions were capable of confusing and thereby misleading the 
jury," we must reverse.  Id.  
          It is not entirely clear whether the trial court 
intended that its instruction that the jury had to find that 
Wilson acted "with deliberate or reckless indifference to 
[Mosley's] safety," App. at 32-33, was to pertain only to the 
excessive force claim or to both civil rights claims.  The 
instruction did not identify the particular "constitutional 
rights" to which it referred.  Reading the full charge, we 
believe there was sufficient ambiguity in this regard that the 
jury could have been led to believe that it had to find that 
Wilson acted with deliberate or reckless indifference with regard 
to both civil rights claims.   
         In a case such as this, where it is undisputed that the 
arrest and use of force were intentional acts, the district court 
erred by instructing the jury as to "deliberate indifference."  
This instruction required the jury to determine the officer's 
subjective intent, whereas the appropriate inquiry on both civil 
rights claims is an objective one.   
         To find that there was an unlawful arrest in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment, the jury need only have found that under 
the facts and circumstances within Wilson's knowledge, a 
reasonable officer could not have believed that an offense had 
been or was being committed by the person to be arrested.  SeeOrsatti v. 
New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 
1995); United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1039 (1991).  To find that Wilson used 
excessive force, the jury was required to determine whether he 
used force that was objectively reasonable under the 
circumstances and facts confronting him at that time, without 
regard to his underlying motivation.  See Groman v. Township of 
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995).  Neither of these 
inquiries required the jury to consider Wilson's subjective 
intent.  Accordingly, an instruction on "deliberate indifference" 
had no place in connection with either of the § 1983 claims and 
erroneously added an element of subjective intent to Mosley's 
claims. 
         The district court cited Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 
817, 828 (3d. Cir. 1984) (en banc), affirmed sub nom. Davidson v. 
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986), in support of its deliberate 
indifference instruction.  In Davidson, we held that an 
allegation that prison officials had negligently failed to 
protect the plaintiff inmate from another inmate did not state a 
claim under § 1983 for deprivation of a Fourteenth Amendment 
liberty interest, a conclusion affirmed by the Supreme Court.   
That case is inapplicable here where there is no dispute that 
Wilson committed intentional acts when he arrested Mosley and 
used physical force against him.  Whether he intended to violate 
his civil rights in the process is irrelevant. 
         Wilson argues that even if there were error in the 
charge, it was harmless.  As his counsel stated at oral argument: 
"I simply do not believe that given the facts of the case, this 
notion of `deliberate indifference'. . . that doesn't appear to 
have any direct application here would have been a serious 
consideration."  Alternatively, Wilson argues that the error 
actually benefitted Mosley by allowing the jury to find in his 
favor even if the deprivation of his rights was not intentional, 
because the deliberate indifference standard is "lower" than that 
for an intentional deprivation of rights.  Appellee's Brief at 
13-14. 
         A trial court's errors are harmless only if it is 
"highly probable" that they did not affect the outcome of the 
case.  McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 924 (3d 
Cir. 1985).  We need not decide whether in all circumstances a 
jury instruction that has no application to the charges at issue 
leads to reversible error because in this case we believe that 
the charge was indeed "capable of confusing and thereby 
misleading the jury."  Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 462.   
         The jury could not be expected to understand that the 
deliberate indifference instruction was inapplicable and should 
have been disregarded.  Certainly the deliberate indifference 
charge given could have led a jury consisting of laypersons 
unfamiliar with the complex jurisprudence of § 1983 to inject a 
state of mind inquiry.  It may have believed that to find for 
Mosley on his unlawful arrest claim, it was required to find not 
only that Wilson lacked probable cause to arrest him but also 
that Wilson was subjectively aware of the potential violation of 
Mosley's rights, and "deliberately indifferent" thereto.  
Similarly, as to the excessive force claim, the charge could have 
led a jury to believe that it had to find not only that Wilson 
used excessive force under the circumstances, but that he did so 
with "deliberate indifference," in the sense that he was aware 
that the force he was using might be excessive.  Because a 
finding concerning the officer's state of mind is not required 
for either civil rights claim, we cannot find that it is "highly 
probable" that the jury's verdict was unaffected by the 
deliberate indifference instruction and therefore harmless error.  
We will therefore also remand the § 1983 claims as well to the 
district court for a new trial. 
                               III. 
                            CONCLUSION 
         For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of 
the district court granting Wilson judgment as a matter of law on 
the malicious prosecution claim, and remand that claim as well as 
Mosley's civil rights claims to the district court for a new 
trial. 
______________________ 
 
 
 
 
